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Abstract
We provide new evidence on the impact of recessions on traffic accidents by exploit-
ing the case of Spain, where the effects of the 2008 economic crisis have been among
the strongest in the developed world. We exploit differences in the incidence of the re-
cession across Spanish provinces due to the unequal evolution of the real estate bubble
across the country. We use a unique dataset on the universe of traffic accidents in Spain
between 2004 and 2011. We first follow the literature on the topic and examine the
impact of the economic crisis on the probability of having a traffic accident. However,
we also go one step further, as we are able to identify any changes in the composition of
both victims and driving behaviors as a result of the crisis. First, our results show that
the Great Recession reduced traffic accidents in Spain. Second, regarding the composi-
tional effects, we observe decreased probabilities of dying or reporting a serious injury.
More important, we also detect an increase in the probability that people involved in
an accident abused alcohol and drugs. Our results are robust to different measures of
the crisis and the use of a spatial fixed effects model and are not biased by anticipatory
effects. Finally, we show that our findings are driven by less-populated areas. Thus,
we suggest that alcohol and drug control measures be reinforced during recessions and
that more attention should be devoted to rural areas to strengthen the reduction in
road traffic accidents.
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1 Introduction
There is a substantial literature on the short-run effects of economic crises on health outcomes.
This paper contributes to this literature by exploiting the case study of Spain and focusing
on what are defined as avoidable health costs: fatalities and injuries due to road traffic
accidents. Recent works have revealed the existence of a casual relationship between the
density of traffic and the incidence of traffic accidents (Romem and Shurtz 2016). Economic
recessions are proven to reduce traffic density: more people are unemployed, and thus, their
consumption habits change. Fewer need to drive to work, or they drive outside rush hours.
This initially appears to be a positive spillover of economic crises. However, by the same
token, the composition of accidents could change. For instance, an income effect might
mean that shorter trips, for which the level of adopted precautions might be lower, could
be favored over longer trips. Similarly, one might expect vehicle owners to perform less
maintenance work due to income loss. This could increase the incidence of accidents or
change the composition of the remaining accidents by, for example, increasing the likelihood
of suffering a more severe accident. However, the opposite could also be true: one could
decide to use a car only if it is in good condition because the monetary costs of an accident
are now unaffordable. In addition, younger people, who are more affected by an employment
crisis and are generally riskier drivers, are more likely to withdraw from the pool of potential
drivers. By contrast, the set of older drivers, who might be less likely to have an accident,
should be unchanged. Recent economic work has addressed the existence of this composition
effect. Both Maheshri and Winston (2016) and Cotti and Tefft (2011) provide evidence from
the US of an increase in the incidence of low-risk drivers when there is an economic crisis.
These authors contend that this explains why fatality rates decrease more than accident
rates.
Spain was among the European countries worst affected by the Great Recession of 2007/08.
We rely on a unique dataset of the universe of traffic accidents that occurred in Spain between
2004 and 2011. For each accident, we have data on both the people and vehicles involved.
We exploit the bursting of the real estate bubble in the country as a consequence of the
crisis to identify the effects of the intensity of the Great Recession on the overall number of
accidents. Furthermore, we also analyze any changes in the composition of the remaining
pool of traffic accidents. Once the Great Recession struck, all Spanish provinces underwent
an economic crisis. However, the real estate bubble affected certain provinces more than
others. Assuming that provinces with more people involved in the construction sector suf-
fered more from the Great Recession compared to those with fewer people involved in that
sector (i.e., higher unemployment levels), we assess the effects of the intensity of the crisis on
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road traffic accidents. Our identification relies on the assumption that before the crisis, no
major differences in the type of accidents exist between less construction oriented and more
construction oriented provinces.
The richness of our dataset allows us to analyze not only the differences across provinces
in terms of the accident rate but also to distinguish between the probability of death and
the probability of suffering a severe or a minor injury (i.e., one that is not life treating).
Moreover, we are also able to investigate in detail the composition effect, if any, of the
accident set across provinces.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we evaluate the impact of the intensity of
the economic crisis on the provincial-quarter rate of accidents, defined as the provincial-
quarter number of accidents per 1,000 provincial resident population. Then, we use the
micro data from the universe of individual accidents to investigate the impact of the crisis
on the composition of the remaining pool of traffic accidents. Specifically, we examine the
severity of accidents, defined as the probability of dying and the probability of suffering a
severe or a minor injury.1 We focus on the link between the characteristics of an accident (e.g.,
the consumption of alcohol and drugs, or vehicle and weather conditions) and its severity.
Second, we use these characteristics as outcomes of an independent analysis to investigate
how they were affected by the crisis. We run this analysis on the overall sample of all Spanish
provinces (50 here, as Ceuta and Melilla are excluded because they are two small provinces
located outside Spain) and on a subsample excluding the 4 cities that contain more than
1,000,000 inhabitants (i.e., Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and Seville). This allows us to
check whether the effect could be driven by the most urbanized areas.2 In addition, since
these are the provinces most affected by commuting, dropping them also allows us to mitigate
any potential bias due to commuting patterns.
Our results show that in provinces more affected by the Great Recession (i.e., the employ-
ment rate in the construction sector before the crisis was above the mean of the employment
rate distribution), the overall accident rate decreases by 12% at the mean of the provincial-
quarter accident rate, and the rate of accidents on working days decreases by 14.7%. With
respect to the composition of traffic accidents, we report a decrease in the most severe ac-
cidents, observing a decline in the probability of dying or having a severe injury. However,
1According to the Spanish registry of accidents, a casualty is associated with a road traffic accident
whenever a person dies within the 30 days after the accident. Deaths due to natural causes while driving
(e.g., heart attack) and suicidal acts are excluded from this definition. Severe injuries are recorded whenever
a person needs to be hospitalized for more than 24 hours as a result of an accident. If death occurred within
30 days after the accident, the case is not counted as a major injury. Minor injuries are recorded when a
person needs to be hospitalized for 24 hours or less or does not require hospitalization.
2We are dropping the 4 corresponding provinces, which are easily identifiable with their main cities.
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the probability of suffering a minor injury increases. Back-of-the-envelope calculations, per-
formed using the Value of a Statistical Life, provide an estimated savings on avoidable health
expenditures due to road traffic deaths equal to 3 billion euros redistributed across Spanish
provinces. The average age of people (and drivers) involved in an accident increases, due a
decrease in the involvement of younger people and an increase in the involvement of older
people. More important, people/drivers are more likely to be caught under the influence of
alcohol. Furthermore, the average number of vehicles involved decreased, while the average
number of people in a vehicle increased. Vehicles show fewer maintenance problems and are
used for shorter trips, while accidents are less likely to occur during rush hours.
We perform a number of robustness checks both using alternative definitions of the treat-
ment and testing different specifications of our baseline. As alternative proxies for the crisis,
we use the employment rate in the construction sector at the provincial level as a continuous
variable, rather than as a dummy, and the overall unemployment rate.3 As an alternative
specification of our baseline, we include weekday fixed effects, more detailed controls for
weather conditions and/or a different clustering method for the standard errors. None of
these robustness checks affect the validity of our results, which also hold in the less densely
populated provinces (i.e., when dropping Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Sevilla). Finally,
our findings at the provincial-quarter level are also robust to the use of a spatial panel fixed
effects model.
These results are consistent with the large literature that reports positive health effects
of economic recessions in the short run. Following the pioneering work by Rumh (2000), who
shows that mortality decreased during downturns in the US, a number of additional papers
have reported the same results for several other countries and for other health outcomes and
health behaviors such as smoking, home-cooked meals or exercise. For the particular case of
Spain, Tapia Granados (2005) shows that death rates increase during economic expansions
and decrease during recessions (except for male suicides, which increase). The authors use
data for the period 1980-1997, and thus, their results do not include the recent economic
crisis. Other papers examining the impact of the 2008 recession in Spain focus on children’s
weight (Bells et al. 2016), drug consumption (Martin Bassols and Vall Castello, 2016) or
self-assessed health and mental health (Urbanos-Garrido and Lopez-Valcarcel, 2015). The
results of these recent papers are not as clear as those of previous years, and the pro-cyclical
relationship reported in studies analyzing previous economic cycles may no longer hold for
3We also defined the treatment on the basis of the median of the distribution of the employment rate
in the construction sector rather than the mean. We plot the trends in the accident rates of treated and
controls according to this definition of treatment in Figure A1 of the Online Appendix. The results based on
this treatment definition are available upon request.
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the latest economic crisis. Urbanos-Garrido and Lopez-Valcarcel (2015) find that both self-
assessed health and mental health deteriorate (particularly for the long-term unemployed),
while Bells et al. (2016) find reductions in children’s obesity rates but also increases in the
probability of being underweight for young children (aged 2 to 6). Finally, Martin Bassols
and Vall Castello (2016) report increases in the consumption of marijuana and cocaine as a
result of the 2008 economic crisis, in addition to a reduction in regular alcohol consumption
and increases in the probability of smoking on a daily basis. Overall, the effects of the
recent crisis in terms of health outcomes are more mixed than what has been reported for
previous business cycle fluctuations in Spain. In a recent contribution, Ruhm (2015) pursues
a similar line of investigation with respect to the US experience and also reports a shift in
total mortality rates from being pro-cyclical to being unrelated to macroeconomic conditions.
Ruhm also shows that, for the US, transport accidents continue to behave in a pro-cyclical
manner even during the 2008 recession, following Miller et al. (2009), who show that the
initial studies by Rumh are driven primarily by the decrease in road traffic fatality rates
during recessions.
Thanks to the richness of our dataset, our results go one step further than the current
literature on the avoidable health costs of road traffic accidents. We believe that our results
are important to understand not only the target groups associated with fatality rates but also
injuries on roads. Additionally, our findings show that less densely populated areas, where
the use of private transportation is higher and more frequent, deserve special consideration
when targeting a reduction in road traffic accidents, especially during bad economic times.
Finally, we also draw attention to the increase in alcohol consumption by drivers as a result
of the economic crisis. This last finding suggests that alcohol controls should be reinforced
during recessions to maximize the benefits of reduced accident rates.
2 Background and Data
The economic crisis that began in 2008 affected many countries around the world. However,
in Spain, the recession had some distinct features: it was affected by both the global financial
crisis and a construction bubble. The global financial crisis caused gross domestic product
(GDP) to contract, which was accompanied by reduced capital investment and domestic
demand. As Figure 1 shows, GDP growth in Spain posted negative numbers in 2008 for the
first time in 15 years. At the height of the recession, Spains GDP declined by more than at
any other time since the contraction following the Civil War. The decline in GDP growth
began at the beginning of 2008, going from 3.5% in the fourth quarter of 2007 to 2.9% in the
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first quarter of 2008. In the fourth quarter of 2008 GDP growth reached negative numbers
(-1.25%). There was a mild recovery in the last three quarters of 2010 (with small positive
GDP growth), but in the first quarter of 2011, GDP growth turned negative again until 2014
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1 about here
Simultaneously, Spain faced a construction crisis with the bursting of the so-called Spanish
real estate bubble.4 During the first half of the 2000s, rising housing prices in Spain led to
the mass construction of new buildings. The Bank of Spain estimates that housing prices
rose 100% in real terms between 1997 and 2006 (which is the equivalent of 150% in nominal
prices), and 5 million new houses were built between 2000 and 2009. Between 1997 and
2006, the construction sector’s contribution to total value added increased by 15% in the
USA, 28% in the UK and 67% in Spain (Aparicio, 2014). As a result of this rapid growth,
according to data from the Bank of Spain, investment in construction in Spain accounted
for 22% of GDP in 2007 (Banco de Espana, 2012). The booming economy entailed very
low levels of unemployment (below 10%), which is unusual for Spain. However, coinciding
with the global economic crisis and the bursting of the construction bubble, unemployment
rates increased dramatically from 2008 until 2013, when they began to decrease. At its
peak, the unemployment rate reached 27% in the first trimester of 2013. Although it has
continuously decreased since then, the unemployment rate still stood at 18.6% in 2016. Figure
2 shows the overall trend of unemployment between 2002 and 2016. An important part of
the increase in unemployment was led by the collapse of the construction sector in Spain. To
illustrate this, Figure 3 plots the composition of unemployment in Spain according to each
sector of activity (agriculture, industry, construction, services and those without previous
employment) from 2001 to 2012. We constructed this Figure using data from the Spanish
Public Employment Service (Servicio Publico de Empleo Estatal). In the Figure we can see
that a very important share of the increase in unemployment that occurred from 2008 onward
occurred in the construction sector.
This second element of the economic crisis, the construction bubble, was concentrated
in specific areas of Spain. Therefore, the crisis was unevenly felt across the country. The
local economies of a number of Spanish regions were based on the construction sector, but
others relied on different sectors such as services or manufacturing. As a result, when the
4Spain was not the only country to suffer a construction bubble, but the intensity of this bubble in Spain
was generally stronger than in other countries. For example, between 2001 and 2008 in the United States,
one new house was constructed for every 23.5 citizens. In Spain, one new house was constructed for every
9.2 citizens during the same period.
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bubble burst, some regions felt the impacts more strongly, and regional unemployment rates
responded accordingly. Therefore, unemployment rates varied substantially across Spanish
provinces, with some regions experiencing strong increases in unemployment, while in others
it remained relatively low, as shown in Figure 4, Panel (a). In Panel (b), we plot the
differences across provinces in the employment growth rate for the construction sector. In
Panel (a), the darker areas identify those provinces where the unemployment rate increased
the most, while in Panel (b), the darker shading identifies provinces where employment in the
construction sector decreased the most. From Figure 4, it is apparent that there is a strong
geographical correlation between provinces where unemployment increased and those where
employment in the construction sector decreased. As a consequence, we exploit the different
rates of employment in the construction sector in 2007 as a predictor of the intensity with
which the crisis was experienced at the provincial level from 2008.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 about here
We use register data from the universe of traffic accidents in Spain between 2004 and 2011
from the Spanish General Traffic Directorate. For each accident, we have detailed information
on the characteristics of the accident, the persons and vehicles involved and the type of road
where it took place. As a result, we can exploit three datasets: one at the accident level,
one at the vehicle level, and one at the individual level. Overall, during our observational
period, 730,606 road traffic accidents occurred involving 1,278,248 vehicles and 1,752,029
individuals. Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics. At the provincial-quarter level,
there are 0.48 accidents per 1,000 inhabitants, which is not dramatically different from the
value for the sample that excludes Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and Seville. The accident
rate during workdays declines to 0.25 and 0.24 in the two samples. On average, 1% of the
people involved in a road traffic accident die, 8% report a serious injury, and nearly 52%
report minor injuries. The average age of a person involved is approximately 37, with 17%
of the people being older than 60. Additionally, 2% of the people were under the influence
of alcohol, and over 60% were taking some form of precaution while in the vehicle. Rush
hours accounted for 53% of accidents; more than 86% were experienced during good weather
conditions and while driving on dry and clean streets.
Table 1 and Figure 5 about here
Finally, for consistency with Figure 4, Figure 5 shows the rate of growth in both the
accident rate and the weekday accident rate at the provincial level. We built the growth
rate using the average accident rate per province for the period before and after the crisis.
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It appears that areas that suffered from a decrease in employment in the construction sector
are also those where the accident rates decreased the most.
3 Empirical Strategy
When the Great Recession began, some provinces faced higher unemployment than others;
thus, our empirical analysis identifies the effect of an increase in the intensity of unemploy-
ment. Since employment in the construction sector and the growth rate of unemployment
are highly correlated, as shown in Section 2, we pay particular attention to the interaction
effect of having an accident in a province that registered an above-mean employment level
in the construction sector in the first quarter of 2007 (treated group) compared to having
an accident in a province with a below-mean level of employment in the construction sector
in the first quarter of 2007 (control group) before and after the beginning of the recession
in 2008. We use the first quarter of 2007, as this coincides with the peak of the real estate
bubble. Thus, we use the distribution of the employment rate in this quarter to define treated
and control.
Define Accidentspq as the accidents collapsed at the provincial-quarter-year level and nor-
malized to thousands of provincial residents, while Severityipt defines one of three dummy
variables: Death, which is equal to 1 if the person involved in the accident died, Severe Injury,
which is equal to 1 if the person involved in the accident reported a major injury, and
Minor Injury, which is equal to 1 if the person involved in the accident reported a minor
injury. Our analysis is based on the estimation of the following models:
Accidentspq = δCrisispq + γq + αp + εp (1)
δ is the coefficient of interest, where Crisis=Treatedp ∗ Post08q. Treated is equal to 1
if province p had an employment rate in the construction sector above the mean in the first
quarter of 2007 and 0 otherwise. Post08 is a dummy equal to 1 for the period after the first
quarter q of 2008, 0 otherwise. γq are the quarter-year fixed effects to control for common
shocks and seasonality effects; αp are provincial fixed effects to control for unobservable time-
invariant characteristics at the provincial level, such as driving habits. Standard errors are
clustered at the provincial level for the model in Equation 1 and at the provincial-quarter
level for the model in Equation 2 to address serial correlation problems.
In this setup, we need to address two major concerns. First, as a consequence of the crisis,
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the resident population in each province could change, as people could emigrate in search
of a job from more- to less-affected provinces. This could affect our outcome variables.
Accidentspq could increase or decrease, not because there is a direct change in the number of
accidents, but because the denominator varies. In addition, people who decide to move could
be also the most skilled, and this could affect the probability of having a more- or less-severe
type of injury. Obviously, if this is the scenario in place, this would be the effect of the crisis
but through a different, indirect channel. Finally, the crisis could have triggered migration
among the younger population – or the population most able to work – with consequences
for the composition effect. Second, we need to show that before the crisis took place, the
trends in accident rates were common across treated and control provinces.
Figure 6 shows the parallel trends in the resident populations in treated and control
provinces, overall and as percentages of residents younger than 30 and between 30 and 60,
while Figure 7 shows the trends in accident rates. It is apparent that treated and control
provinces do have common trends before the crisis struck in 2008, when the decrease in
the accident rates is higher in treated than in control provinces. In addition, this analysis
does not reveal any change in the resident population figures as a consequence of the crisis,
and the percentages of younger residents display common trends across treated and control
provinces. Panel (c) of Figure 6 reveals the convergence of the trends in the percentage of
the population between 30 and 60 between treated and control provinces after the crisis.
However, this range of population increases for the treated, meaning that we should expect
an increase in accidents involving this segment of the population if our results are driven by
a pure migration effect.
Figures 6 and 7, about here
Once we estimate Equation 1, we focus our analysis on exploring any changes in the
composition of the traffic accident pool as a result of the onset of the Great Recession. Thus,
we analyze changes in the severity of accidents and any changes in behaviors (individual level),
skills (individual level) or conditions (accident level) on the remaining traffic accidents. We
estimate the model described by Equation 2, which adds a series of controls, at both the
people and accident levels, grouped in the vector X1
′
ipt.
5 For the analysis at the individual
level, we consider as controls the use of alcohol, age, being stressed or tired, the adoption of
precautions while driving, the type of driving experience, and whether the vehicles involved
had any maintenance problems. For the analysis at the accident level, we include as controls
5i indicates the individual level. When we analyze the accident level, we replace i with a, which represents
characteristics at the accident level.
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the role played by weather and road conditions, as well as the occurrence of more severe
accidents on certain days or at certain hours.6
Severityipt = δCrisispq +X1
′
ipt + γq + αp + εpt (2)
X1ipt = δCrisispq + γq + αp + εpt (3)





apt) when estimating Equation 3. This step allows us to detect
how the crisis affected the composition of the people involved in a road traffic accident and
the accident types. In doing so, we estimate the models on the dataset that includes all
provinces and on a subsample from which we drop the four largest cities in Spain (i.e., those
with above 1 million residents): Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and Seville. We do this for
several reasons: first, we want to rule out the possibility that our effects are driven solely by
these four metropolitan cities. Second, we want to explore the existence of any systematic
differences in terms of accident composition in more densely populated versus rural areas.
Third, we want to attenuate concerns related to the fact that those areas will receive more
commuters from nearby provinces, meaning that some of the accidents occurring in these
largest provinces may involve individuals not living in them.7 The importance of these
distinctions is confirmed by a heterogeneity analysis performed at the provincial-quarter
level by exploiting three types of provincial-level information: infrastructure investments,
population density, and the number of registered vehicles. To assess whether the responses
to the crisis differed, conditional on the magnitude of one of these three measures, we estimate
the model in Equation 1 while adding a dummy D equal to 1 if one of these variables is above
the mean of its distribution for a province p in year 2007 (before the crisis) and zero otherwise.
6According to descriptive evidence, more severe accidents tend to occur during the weekend and in
apparently good driving conditions; see Bertoli and Grembi (2017).
7To provide an idea of the importance of commuters, we use the 2007 Spanish Labor Force Survey to
calculate the percentage of individuals in each province that commute to another province for work. We
calculated that in 77% of the provinces in Spain, the number of commuters was lower than 6%. Only in
three provinces (out of the 50 provinces in Spain) was the number of commuters higher than 10% (10.62% in
Avila, 14.68% in Guadalajara and 11.23% in Toledo), and these provinces neighbor Madrid. Therefore, we
believe that these are relatively small numbers of commuters that will not lead to important biases. Finally,
due to the inclusion of provincial fixed effects in all regressions, if commuting behavior remains stable over
time, then any commuter effect should be absorbed by the fixed effects.
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We interact D with Crisis to assess whether provinces with a higher/lower value of each of
these measures reacted differently. As shown in Table A2 in the Online Appendix, the effect
on accident rates is driven primarily by less densely populated areas.
4 Results
In the provinces more affected by the economic crisis, the accident rate decreased by 12% at
the mean of the variable, while there is a stronger decrease (of 14.7%) in the accident rate
during workdays, as shown in Table 2. Figure 8 plots the coefficients of the leads and lags for
the quarters before and after the effect of the economic crisis to check for any anticipatory
effect. We do not find any significant difference in the accident rate between the treatment
and control group in the period before the onset of the economic crisis. Furthermore, we
observe a significant decline in the accident rate from the first quarter of the economic crisis.
Table 2 and Figure 8, about here
We recognize that in the present setup, the accident rates of neighboring provinces may
show a certain degree of correlation. Provinces are of a relatively small size, and individuals
clearly move across them to work, go shopping, participate in leisure activities, and so forth.
As a consequence, it is reasonable to expect that the accident rate in a province may also be
affected by how much the neighboring provinces are suffering from the crisis. To control for
these potential effects, we move from Equation 1 and estimate a spatial panel fixed effects
model that allows us to account for both spatial lag and spatial error correlation (Anselin,
1998).8 The spatial model confirms both the magnitude and sign of the effects of the full
baseline regression (Table 2). In addition, it also supports the expected positive correlation
between the accident rates of neighboring provinces: high accident rates in neighboring
provinces are associated with higher rates in the province under consideration. Thus, this
provides additional evidence on the robustness of the results while adding additional insights
into the spillover effects across neighboring provinces.
8Equation 1 is changed as follows:
Accidentspq = ρWAccidentspq + δCrisispq + γq + αp + εpq (4)
εpq = λEεpq + upq (5)
where W is the spatial matrix for the spatially lagged dependent variable, E the spatial matrix for the error
term, ρ the spatial autoregressive coefficient, and λ the spatial autocorrelation parameter. We consider a
row-standardized weighting matrix computed using the Euclidean distances between the centroids of the
provinces.
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If we turn to the analysis to the compositional effects and focus on the severity of accidents,
Table 3 shows that the probability of dying (for the analysis at the individual level) in an
accident decreases by 21.4% at the mean of Death, while the probability of reporting a
severe injury decreases by 21% at the mean of SevereInjury. Interestingly, the probability
of reporting a minor injury increases as a consequence of the crisis, by 2.5%. In the subsample
of provinces that excludes the large cities, the direction of the effect is confirmed while the
magnitude of the impact changes slightly: the probability of dying declines by 15.8%, that
of a major injury declines by 16.3%, and that of reporting a minor injury increases by 3.5%.
We now briefly analyze the determinants of each of the severity levels of an accident
in an attempt to shed some light on the potential explanations driving the changes in the
probability of having each type of accident due to the economic crisis. By examining Table
3, we can assess how different behaviors and characteristics affect the different degrees of
accident severity. For instance, the consumption of alcohol and drugs negatively affects the
probability of dying or reporting a major injury but positively affects the probability of
reporting a minor injury. New vehicles are more likely to be involved in cases of deaths or
severe injuries than in cases of minor injuries. However, if the vehicle has any maintenance
problems, this increases the severity of an accident under all three dimensions of severity, as
does having few years of driving experience. In general, short trips are more associated with
less-severe outcomes. The results do not change substantially when moving to the sample
without the four large cities, which reinforces the idea that these are common patterns
across both more- and less-populated regions. Both the direction and the magnitude of the
effect of the economic crisis are confirmed by the analysis using the accident-level dataset.
Table 4 shows the results. 9 The number of deaths per accident decreased by 21% (or 0.7
fewer deaths per 100 accidents—0.007*100) at the mean of the variable, while the number
of seriously injured individuals decreased by 21%, and the number of minor injured people
increased by 1.7%. In the sample without the four large cities, the corresponding values are
-17.4%, -18.6%, and +2.7%. The most severe accidents (i.e., more deaths and more severely
injured) take place not on workdays or during rush hours but rather during weekends. In
addition, they generally involve fewer vehicles and clean streets, and have a lower probability
of occurring during good weather conditions.
Tables 3 and 4 about here
Tables 5 and 6 report the impact of the economic crisis on the main characteristics
and behaviors of people involved in traffic accidents. To provide a better picture of the
9This means that we are not estimating the effect on the probability of dying, for instance, but on the
number of deaths at the accident level.
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composition effect, we split the variable Age using three dummies, one for people less than
30 years old, one for those aged from 30 to 60 years, and one for people older than 60.
We also distinguish between all individuals involved in an accident versus only considering
the drivers of the vehicles involved. Overall, the average age at which individuals have an
accident increases during the economic crisis. From the pool of injured individuals, those
more likely to be employed (i.e., younger people) are being replaced by those older than 60
years. Similarly, the incidence of people acting under the influence of drugs and alcohol also
increases. In terms of the composition of the pool of people involved in accidents, more had
driving experience, while there is no difference in gender, nationality, the tendency to report
being tired or stressed when the accident occurred or in their use of precautions (Table 5,
Panels A-B-C). Considering drivers in isolation, we see that they tend to have more driving
experience, be Spanish, have abused drugs and alcohol, and be older (Table 5, Panels D-E-F).
Again, there is a change in the composition of the age groups (with a lower incidence among
the younger and higher incidence among the 60-plus group).
Overall, there were fewer maintenance problems reported but also fewer new vehicles
involved (Table 6). Nevertheless, the number of people in the vehicles increased, and pedes-
trians were more likely to be involved (Panels A and B). Finally, as shown in Panels C, D,
and E, fewer accidents were recorded during rush hours or workdays. Regarding the length
of the trip, short trips slightly increased.
These results are consistent with the idea that, due to the substantial job losses triggered
by the recession, there is a strong reduction in the number of people using their vehicle to
go to work, and thus, the accidents associated with job-related commuters are disappearing
from the pool of accidents (e.g., fewer accidents for working-age individuals, during rush
hours and on workdays). However, we also detect an increase in the number of accidents due
to alcohol- and drug-related problems in the pool of traffic accidents. This is consistent with
the reduction in the severity of accidents during the economic crisis, as alcohol consumption
is associated with milder accidents (as seen in Table 3). In any case, the increase in alcohol-
and drug- related accidents during recessions stands as an important finding, as it prevents
further reductions in the overall accident rate during bad economic times.
Tables 5 and 6, about here
The picture we obtain from the same analysis on the subsample of provinces that excludes
the four large cities presents some small differences, as reported in Tables 7 and 8. Some
results are the same as in the overall sample. For example, age increases throughout Spanish
territory (Panels A and D in Table7), and the probability of drivers having consumed drugs
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and alcohol when involved in an accident increases (Panels B and E). The main differences in
the sample without the large cities are that there is a decrease in the likelihood of reporting
being stressed and tired and an increase in the adoption of precautions (Panels B-C and E-
F). Finally, the economic crisis does not change the probability of having an accident during
rush hours or on workdays when we restrict the sample to exclude the four large cities, as we
reported for the overall sample. Thus, it appears that the employment destruction channel
is more important in explaining the reduction in the total number of accidents in large cities
than in the rest of the less-densely populated territory. A further minor difference with the
analysis of the full sample is a decrease in the probability of having an accident during good
weather conditions and on dry and clean roads (Table 8, Panel D). Thus, it appears that the
decision of when (under what conditions) to drive was most affected in this sample.
Tables 7 and 8, about here
5 Robustness checks
We test our baseline results on the severity of accidents, at both the individual and accident
levels, using alternative definitions of the treatment. First, we retain our initial measure
(i.e., the employment level in the construction sector), but we do not use a dummy based on
the mean of the distribution of the variable; instead, we use a continuous variable. Hence,
the new treatment is the interaction between the level of employment in the construction
sector and the dummy Post08q. Second, we use the overall level of unemployment, rather
than focusing on the employment level in a specific sector. In this alternative scenario, the
treatment is defined as the interaction between the level of unemployment and the dummy
Post08q. We test Equation 2 using these two types of treatment and we report the results
in Table 9. The direction and the significance of the effect of the crisis is consistent with our
baseline specification.
To test the robustness of our specification, we also refine some of our control variables.
First, we use weekday fixed effects, rather than weekdays or the dummy for the weekend and
our main results are confirmed as shown in Panels A and H of Table 10. Second, our findings
are robust also to the inclusion of more refined controls for weather conditions10 as reported
in Panels B and I, as well as to that of both weekday fixed effects and the weather controls
(Panels C and J). Third, we use a two-way clustering by province and date, rather than the
one-way clustering at the province-quarter-year, for the standard errors. This check allows
10Specifically, we replace the general control for good weather conditions with three dummies controlling
for sunny days (Sunny), rainy days (Rain) and foggy days (Fog).
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us to take into account both time and the geographical serial correlations. Panels D and K
of Table 10 show the results. Finally, we combine the two-way clustering with weekday fixed
effects and weather controls in a stepwise manner, as shown in Panels E-G and L-N.
Tables 9 and 10, about here
6 Conclusions
The literature has established that accident rates decrease when the economy deteriorates.
However, less is known about the composition of accidents during bad economic times. We
contribute to this literature by analyzing the response of accident rates to the 2008 Great
Recession in Spain.
Our results show a 12% decrease in the accident rate at the mean of the variable in the
provinces more affected by the crisis. This is combined with a decrease in the probabilities of
dying and of suffering a major injury. To quantify the “savings” in terms of avoidable death-
related expenditures, we compute some back-of-the-envelope calculations using the Value of
a Statistical Life provided by the OECD (2012) and based on the average of 27 countries,
which is equal to 4,131,970 euros. Since our estimated coefficient on the probability of
dying is 0.003 and the number of accidents in 2007 in Spain is equal to 242,957, these
savings amount to (0.003*242,957)=729*4,131,970=3,012,206,130 euros distributed across
the various provinces.11
In addition to this composition effect across accidents, our analysis also reveals a strong
composition effect across the types of people involved in the accidents. People modify their
behaviors, and there is a substitution across generations. Specifically, the incidence of people
older than 60, as well as those acting under the influence of drugs and alcohol, increases.
Finally, our findings are not driven by the most densely populated areas of the country.
From a policy perspective, these results offer relevant insights to better address traffic ac-
cidents during recessions. Our paper provides interesting information on how people change
their driving behavior and habits when economic conditions deteriorate. Although the ac-
cident rate decreased as a result of the 2008 Great Recession, policy makers could further
combat traffic accidents by targeting dangerous behaviors. Those behaviors are more likely
to affect the most severe health outcomes of accidents. For example, more effort could be
devoted to discouraging people from driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs. This
11We cannot provide a similar calculation for the avoided severe injuries, as we lack sufficient information
on the average compensation paid per accident.
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could be done by simply reinforcing existing policies such as increasing the number of alco-
hol and drug tests on the roads. More interestingly, during bad economic times, efforts to
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Trimestral Variation Yearly Variation 
Source: Spanish Institute of Statistics. The dashed line represents the yearly
variation, while the continuous line the quarterly variation.
Figure 2: Unemployment Rate in Spain (2002-2016)
Source: Spanish Institute of Statistics.
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Figure 3: Unemployment By Sector













Agriculture Industry Construction Services No Previous Job 
Source: Spanish Public Employment Service (Servicio Publico de Empleo Estatal).
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Figure 4: Unemployment and Employment in the Construction Sector
(a) Male Unemployment (Growth rate before/after the crisis)
(b) Employment in the construction sector (Growth rate be-
fore/after the crisis)
Note: The growth rates are constructed using, for each variable, the
average provincial-quarter value before (2004-2007) and after (2008-
2011) the crisis. In Figure (1), darker provinces are those affected
by higher male unemployment growth rates, whereas in Figure (2),
darker provinces are those that experienced a larger decrease in the




All Provinces No Large Cities
Obs. Mean St.Dev Obs. Mean St.Dev
Panel A: Provincial-quarter Level
Accident rate 1,600 0.482 0.196 1,472 0.473 0.196
Working day accident rate 1,600 0.253 0.129 1,472 0.244 0.125
Panel B: Accident Level
Death 730,606 0.033 0.202 409,760 0.046 0.240
Serious Injury 730,606 0.194 0.494 409,760 0.247 0.554
Minor Injury 730,606 1.237 0.980 409,760 1.234 1.055
No state street 730,606 0.823 0.382 409,760 0.761 0.426
Working days 730,606 0.565 0.496 409,760 0.527 0.499
Weekend 730,606 0.266 0.442 409,760 0.293 0.455
Rush hours 730,606 0.532 0.499 409,760 0.526 0.499
Good weather 730,606 0.866 0.340 409,760 0.852 0.355
Dry&Clean street 730,606 0.851 0.356 409,760 0.829 0.377
Vehicles 730,606 1.748 0.784 409,760 1.681 0.775
Pedestrians 728,517 0.126 0.366 407,671 0.110 0.349
People in vehicles 671,499 2.335 2.167 407,362 2.347 2.214
Panel C: Individual Level
Death 1,752,029 0.014 0.116 977,393 0.019 0.138
Serious Injury 1,752,029 0.081 0.272 977,393 0.104 0.305
Minor Injury 1,752,029 0.516 0.500 977,393 0.517 0.500
Spanish 1,679,625 0.853 0.354 942,520 0.863 0.343
Age 1,614,270 36.810 16.372 911,762 36.933 16.875
Age less 30 1,771,809 0.354 0.478 987,656 0.365 0.482
Age 30 60 1,771,809 0.460 0.498 987,656 0.451 0.498
Age more 60 1,771,809 0.175 0.380 987,656 0.174 0.379
Female 1,733,700 0.300 0.458 965,543 0.303 0.459
Alcohol 1,752,029 0.021 0.144 977,393 0.025 0.155
Stressed&tired 1,771,809 0.006 0.078 987,656 0.009 0.094
Passenger 1,752,029 0.229 0.420 977,393 0.260 0.439
Precautions 1,771,809 0.646 0.478 987,656 0.686 0.464
Less driving experience 1,771,809 0.187 0.390 987,656 0.179 0.383
More driving experience 1,771,809 0.746 0.436 987,656 0.757 0.429
Maintenance problems 1,771,809 0.010 0.102 987,656 0.008 0.091
New vehicles 1,771,809 0.173 0.379 987,656 0.196 0.397
Short Trip 1,679,625 0.429 0.495 942,520 0.548 0.498
Notes: Death, Serious Injury, and Minor Injury at the individual level are dummy variables,
while at the accident level they are continuous variables that count the number of dead, seriously
injured, and minor injured people for each accident. For a detailed explanation of each variable,
see Table A1. The provincial-quarter level is computed by collapsing the data at the provincial-
quarter level and normalizing the value by 1,000 inhabitants.
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Figure 5: Accident rates
(a) Accident Rate (Growth rate before/after the crisis)
(b) Week Days Accident Rate (Growth rate before/after
the crisis)
The growth rates are constructed using, for each variable, the average
provincial-quarter value before (2004-2007) and after (2008-2011) the cri-
sis. In both Figures (1) and (2), darker provinces are those with larger
decreases in accident rates. A negative sign indicates a decrease.
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Figure 6: Population trends
(a) Population (Total) (b) Population (% younger than 30)
(c) Population (% older than 30 and younger than
60)
Note: These figures depict the trend in population at the provincial-year level for the treated and control provinces
once we define treated and control according to the distribution of employment in the construction sector.
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Figure 7: Accident rate trends
Note: We plot the provincial-quarter trends per treated and control of the
number of accidents per 1,000 residents.












Notes: Crisis is the interaction between hav-
ing a provincial level employment rate in the
construction sector above the mean and the
dummy for the period after the first quarter of
2008. λ is the spatial autocorrelation param-
eter, and ρ is the spatial autoregressive coeffi-
cient. Robust standard errors clustered at the
provincial level in parentheses. Significance at
the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Figure 8: Leads and lags of accident rate
Note: The dots are the estimated coefficients for the quarters before and
after the beginning of the crisis. The bars represent the confidence interval
at the 5% significance level.
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Table 3: Severity of an accident (Individual & vehicle levels)
All Provinces No Large Cities
Death Severe Injury Minor Injury Death Severe Injury Minor Injury
Crisis -0.003*** -0.017*** 0.013*** -0.003*** -0.017*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Age 0.000*** 0.00** -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spanish 0.001 0.001 -0.013** 0.001 0.016*** -0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008)
Female -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.116*** -0.009*** -0.027*** 0.114***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Alcohol -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.044*** -0.015*** -0.020*** 0.047***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
Stressed&tired 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.109*** 0.010*** 0.058*** 0.104***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006)
Passengers 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.205*** 0.005*** 0.025*** 0.185***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
Precautions -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.063*** -0.013*** -0.005*** 0.070***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Less driving experience 0.001** 0.001** 0.031*** 0.002** 0.011*** 0.031***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
More driving experience -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.014*** -0.002*** 0.003 0.022***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Maintenance Problems 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.056*** 0.018**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
New Vehicles 0.001** 0.001** -0.007** 0.001 0.013*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Short trip -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.008*** -0.006*** -0.009*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Obs. 1,529,402 1,529,402 1,529,402 870,251 870,251 870,251
Notes: The residual category for driving experience is those who have driving experience of between 5 and 10 years (see Table A1).
The sample without large cities is defined by dropping the observations for the provinces of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and Seville.
In each specification, we control for quarter-year and the province fixed effects and provincial linear trends. Robust standard errors
clustered at the province-quarter-year level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **,
and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 4: Severity of an accident (Accident level)
All Provinces No Large Cities
Death Severe Injury Minor Injury Death Severe Injury Minor Injury
Crisis -0.007*** -0.041*** 0.021** -0.008*** -0.046*** 0.033***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010)
Working day -0.002** -0.009*** -0.028*** -0.002* -0.013*** -0.026***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Weekend 0.008*** 0.041*** 0.079*** 0.008*** 0.043*** 0.062***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006)
Rush Hours -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
No State Street -0.030*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.031*** -0.048*** -0.052***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007)
Good Weather -0.007*** -0.007* -0.011* -0.009*** -0.008 -0.018**
(0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008)
Dry&Clean Street 0.003** 0.026*** -0.074*** 0.003* 0.027*** -0.069***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007)
Vehicles -0.007*** -0.038*** 0.106*** -0.008*** -0.043*** 0.101***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.019) (0.001) (0.004) (0.019)
N. of People in Vehicles 0.005*** 0.023*** 0.185*** 0.006*** 0.028*** 0.203***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.016) (0.001) (0.002) (0.015)
Obs. 671,499 671,499 671,499 407,362 407,362 407,362
Notes: The sample without large cities is defined by dropping the observations for the provinces of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and
Seville. In each specification, we control for quarter-year and province fixed effects and provincial linear trends. Robust standard
errors clustered at the province-quarter-year level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by
**, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 5: Characteristics of the people involved
Panel A: Age
Age Age less 30 Age 30 to 60 Older than 60
Crisis 0.195** -0.011*** -0.014*** 0.023***
(0.097) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Obs. 1,614,270 1,614,270 1,614,270 1,614,270
Panel B: Conditions
Alcohol Stressed &Tired Female Spanish
Crisis 0.004*** 0.000 0.003 0.016
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.012)
Obs. 1,752,029 1,771,809 1,733,700 1,679,625
Panel C: Driving behavior & experience
Precautions Less Driving Experience More Driving Experience
Crisis 0.001 -0.014** 0.020**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.009)
Obs. 1,184,028 1,257,838 1,257,838
Panel D: Age of the drivers
Age Age less 30 Age 30 to 60 Older than 60
Crisis 0.253*** -0.009*** -0.010** 0.019***
(0.093) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Obs. 1,184,028 1,184,028 1,184,028 1,184,028
Panel E: Conditions of the driver
Alcohol Stressed&Tired Female Spanish
Crisis 0.006*** 0 0.002 0.023*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.012)
Obs. 1,257,838 1,257,838 1,247,127 1,257,838
Panel F: Driving behavior & experience of the driver
Precautions Less Driving Experience More Driving Experience
Crisis 0.002 -0.017* 0.024*
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013)
Obs. 1,257,838 1,257,838 1,257,838
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the province-quarter-year level in parentheses. In each specification,
we control for quarter-year and province fixed effects and provincial linear trends. Significance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 6: Vehicles and accident context
Panel A: Number of vehicles
Vehicles Pedestrians People in the vehicle
Crisis -0.016*** 0.011*** 0.068**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.031)
Obs. 730,606 728,517 671,499
Panel B: Conditions




Panel C: Timing and type of accident
Rush Hours Working Days Weekend
Crisis -0.006** -0.040*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.013) (0.003)
Obs. 730,606 730,606 730,606
Panel D: Weather and street status




Panel E: Motive of the trip




Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the province-quarter level in parentheses. In each
specification, we control for quarter-year and province fixed effects and provincial linear trends.
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by
***.
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Table 7: Characteristics of the people involved (No large cities)
Panel A: Age
Age Age less 30 Age 30 to 60 Older than 60
Crisis 0.384*** -0.016*** 0.001 0.016
(0.103) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
Obs. 911,762 911,762 911,762 911,762
Panel B: Conditions
Alcohol Stressed/&Tired Female Spanish
Crisis 0.001 -0.002*** 0.007*** -0.025*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.013)
Obs. 977,393 987,656 942,520 965,543
Panel C: Driving behavior & experience
Precautions Less Driving Experience More Driving Experience
Crisis 0.026*** -0.037*** 0.047***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Obs. 987,656 987,656 987,656
Panel D: Age of the drivers
Age Age less 30 Age 30 to 60 Older than 60
Crisis 0.541*** -0.021*** -0.023 0.021**
(0.091) (0.005) (0.007) (0.01)
Obs. 649,143 649,143 649,143 649,143
Panel E: Conditions of the driver
Alcohol Stressed/&Tired Female Spanish
Crisis 0.002* -0.002** 0.004 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Obs. 678,301 678,301 671,855 678,301
Panel F: Driving behavior & experience of the driver
Precautions Less Driving Experience More Driving Experience
Crisis 0.019** -0.051*** 0.064***
(0.008) (0.01) (0.012)
Obs. 678,301 678,301 678,301
Notes: The sample is defined by dropping the observations for the provinces of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia,
and Seville. In each specification, we control for quarter-year and province fixed effects and provincial linear
trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the province-quarter-year level in parentheses. Significance at the
10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.31
Table 8: Vehicles and accident context (No large cities)
Panel A: Number of vehicles
Vehicles Pedestrians People in the Vehicle
Crisis 0.004 -0.008** 0.131***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.039)
Obs. 409,760 407,671 407,362
Panel B: Conditions




Panel C: Timing and type of accident
Rush Hours Working Days Weekend
Crisis -0.002 -0.012 -0.004
(0.003) (0.010) (0.003)
Obs. 409,760 409,760 409,760
Panel D: Weather and street status




Panel E: Motive of the trip




Notes: The sample is defined by dropping the observations for the provinces of Madrid,
Barcelona, Valencia, and Seville. In each specification, we control for quarter-year and province
fixed effects and provincial linear trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the province-
quarter level in parenthesis. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 9: Robustness using alternative definitions of treatment on accident severity
All Provinces No Large Cities
Death Severe Injury Minor Injury Death Severe Injury Minor Injury
Individual & vehicle level
Panel A: Crisis=Level of employment in the construction sector (Continuous)*Post2008
Crisis -0.000*** -0.002*** 0.002** -0.000** -0.002*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel B: Crisis=Level of overall unemployment (Continuous)*Post2008
Crisis -0.000*** -0.002*** 0.001** -0.000*** -0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 1,529,402 1,529,402 1,529,402 870,251 870,251 870,251
Accident level
Panel C: Crisis=Level of employment in the construction sector (Continuous)*Post2008
Crisis -0.001*** -0.005*** 0.001 -0.001*** -0.006*** 0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Panel D: Crisis=Level of overall unemployment (Continuous)*Post2008
Crisis -0.001*** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.005*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 671,499 671,499 671,499 407,362 407,362 407,362
Notes: These coefficients are generated replicating the results of Tables 3 and 4 using alternative definitions of treatments.
The sample without the large cities is defined by dropping the observations for the provinces of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia,
and Seville. In each specification, we control for quarter-year and province fixed effects and provincial linear trends. Robust
standard errors clustered at the province-quarter-year level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *,
at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 10: Robustness using alternative specifications of accident severity
All Provinces No Large Cities
Death Severe Injury Minor Injury Death Severe Injury Minor Injury
Individual & vehicle level
Panel A: Control for weekdays fixed effects
Crisis -0.003*** -0.017*** 0.013*** -0.003** -0.017*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Panel B: Control for weather conditions
Crisis -0.003*** -0.017*** 0.013*** -0.003*** -0.017*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Panel C: Control for weekdays fixed effects & weather conditions
Crisis -0.003*** -0.017*** 0.013*** -0.003*** -0.017*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Panel D: Two-way clustering
Crisis -0.003*** -0.017*** 0.013 -0.003* -0.017*** 0.018*
(0.001) (0.004) (0.012) (0.001) (0.006) (0.009)
Panel E: Two-way clustering & weekdays fixed effects
Crisis -0.003*** -0.017*** 0.013 -0.003* -0.017*** 0.018*
(0.001) (0.004) (0.012) (0.001) (0.006) (0.009)
Panel F: Two-way clustering & weather conditions
Crisis -0.003*** -0.017*** 0.013 -0.003* -0.017*** 0.018*
(0.001) (0.004) (0.012) (0.001) (0.006) (0.010)
Panel G: Two-way clustering, weekdays fixed effects & weather conditions
Crisis -0.003*** -0.017*** 0.013 -0.003* -0.017*** 0.018*
(0.001) (0.004) (0.012) (0.001) (0.006) (0.010)
Obs. 1,529,402 1,529,402 1,529,402 870,251 870,251 870,251
Accident level
Panel H: Control for weekdays fixed effects
Crisis -0.007*** -0.041*** 0.022** -0.008*** -0.046*** 0.033***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010)
Panel I: Control for weather conditions
Crisis -0.007*** -0.041*** 0.022** -0.008*** -0.046*** 0.033***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010)
Panel J: Control for weather conditions & weather conditions
Crisis -0.007*** -0.041*** 0.022** -0.008*** -0.046*** 0.033***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010)
Panel K: Two-way clustering
Crisis -0.007*** -0.041*** 0.022 -0.008** -0.046*** 0.033
(0.002) (0.009) (0.019) (0.004) (0.015) (0.022)
Panel L: Two-way clustering & weekdays fixed effects
Crisis -0.007*** -0.041*** 0.022 -0.008** -0.046*** 0.033
(0.002) (0.009) (0.019) (0.004) (0.015) (0.022)
Panel M: Two-way clustering & weather conditions
Crisis -0.007*** -0.041*** 0.022 -0.008** -0.046*** 0.033
(0.002) (0.009) (0.019) (0.004) (0.015) (0.022)
Panel N: Two-way clustering, weekdays fixed effects & weather conditions
Crisis -0.007*** -0.041*** 0.022 -0.008** -0.046*** 0.033
(0.002) (0.009) (0.019) (0.004) (0.015) (0.022)
Obs. 671,499 671,499 671,499 407,362 407,362 407,362
Notes: These coefficients are generated replicating the results of Tables 3 and 4 using in Panels A, C, E,
G, H, J, l and N weekday fixed effects, rather than controlling for working days, including more refined
controls for weather conditions in Panels B, C, F, G, I, J, M and N, implementing a two-way clustering
in Panels D-G and K-N and combining weekday fixed effects, weather controls and two-way clustering
in Panels G and N. The sample without the large cities is defined by dropping the observations for the
provinces of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and Seville. In each specification, we control for quarter-
year and province fixed effects and provincial linear trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the
province-quarter-year level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables
This Appendix provides additional tables and figures, which are also discussed in the paper.
In particular, we present the following:
• Accident rate trends with treatment based on the median (Figure A1);
• Variable description (Table A1);
• Accident rate channels (Table A2);
• Accident severity – spatial panel fixed effects (Table A3);
• Continuous treatment: Accident rates at the provincial-quarter level (Table A4);
• Continuous treatment: Characteristics of the people involved (Table A5);
• Continuous treatment: Vehicles and accident context (Table A6);
• Continuous treatment: Characteristics of the people involved without the large cities
(Table A7);
• Continuous treatment: Vehicles and accident context without the large cities (Table
A8)
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Figure A.1: Accidents rate trends with treatment based on the median
Notes: In this figure, treated and control are classified according to the




Death Dummy=1 if the person involved died Individual&Vehicles
Severe Injury Dummy=1 if the person involved reported a Individual&Vehicles
severe injury
Minor Injury Dummy=1 if the person involved reported a Individual&Vehicles
minor injury
Age Continuous Individual&Vehicles
Alcohol&Drugs Dummy=1 if the person involved was under Individual&Vehicles
the effect of drug or alcohol
Female Dummy=1 if the person involved was a female Individual&Vehicles
Less Driving Experience Dummy=1 if the driving license was issued 5 Individual&Vehicles
or less years before the accident
Maintenance Problems Dummy=1 if the vehicle had any tire, break, light Individual&Vehicles
and related problems
More Driving Experience Dummy=1 if the driving license was issued 10 Individual&Vehicles
or more years before the accident
New Vehicles Dummy=1 if the vehicle was registered 2 Individual&Vehicles
years or less before the accident
Passenger Dummy=1 if the person involved/injured was a passenger Individual&Vehicles
Precautions Dummy=1 if any precaution measure was Individual&Vehicles
adopted (e.g., seatbelt, helmet, child restraint system)
Spanish Dummy=1 if the person involved was Spanish Individual&Vehicles
Stressed&tired Dummy=1 if the person involved reported Individual&Vehicles
she was stressed out or tired
Short trip Dummy=1 if the reason for travel was Individual&Vehicles
a short trip
Notes: The data were released by the Spanish General Directorate of Traffic.
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Table A.1: Variables (Cont’d)
Variable Definition Level
Dry&Clean Street Dummy=1 if the accident took place on a clean and Accident
dry street
Good Weather Dummy=1 if the accident took place in good Accident
weather conditions
Sunny Dummy=1 if the accident took place on a sunny day Accident
Foggy Dummy=1 if the accident took place on a foggy day Accident
Rainy Dummy=1 if the accident took place on a rainy day Accident
No State Street Dummy=1 if the accident took place on a street Accident
what is not managed by the central state administration
Rush Hours Dummy=1 if the accident took place from 8 to 9am, Accident
from 12 to 2 pm, and from 6 to 9pm
Vehicles Number of Vehicles involved in the accident Accident
Working Days Dummy=1 if the accident took place on a workday Accident
Weekend Dummy=1 if the accident took place during the weekend Accident
N. of People in the Vehicle Number of people in the vehicles involved in the accident Accident
Investment in Infrastructure Investment in infrastructure by resident population Province
in 10,000s in 2007
Number of Registered The number of register vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants Province
Vehicles in 2007
Population Density Population density in 2007 Province
Notes: The data were released by the Spanish General Directorate of Traffic.
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Table A.2: Accident rate channels
Investment in Infrastructure Population Density Number of Registered Vehicles
Less Investment Low Density Less Registered Vehicles
Crisis -0.058* -0.091*** -0.078**
(0.032) (0.031) (0.038)
More Investment High Density More Registered Vehicles
Crisis -0.062* -0.029 -0.053*
(0 .032) (0.031 ) (0.029)
Difference 0.030 0.062* 0.024
(0.039) (0.034) (0.039)
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the province-quarter level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
Table A.3: Accident severity – spatial panel fixed effects
Death Severe Injury Minor Injury
Crisis -0.003* -0.013** 0.014*
(0.002) (0.006) (0.008)
λ -0.243*** -0.134** -0.011
ρ -0.217** -0.027 0.105
Obs. 1,600 1,600 1,600
Notes: λ is the spatial autocorrelation parameter, and ρ is
the spatial autoregressive coefficient. Robust standard er-
rors clustered at the provincial-quarter level in parentheses.
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Notes: Crisis is the interaction between the
provincial level employment rate in the con-
struction sector and the dummy for the period
after the first quarter of 2008. Robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the provincial level in
parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and
at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.5: Continuous treatment: characteristics of the people involved
Panel A: Age
Age Age less 30 Age 30 to 60 Older than 60
Crisis 0.068*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.005***
(0.026) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 1,614,270 1,614,270 1,614,270 1,614,270
Panel B: Conditions
Alcohol Stressed&Tired Female Spanish
Crisis 0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Obs. 1,752,029 1,771,809 1,733,700 1,679,625
Panel C: Driving behaviour& experience
Precautions Less Driving Experience More Driving Experience
Crisis 0.001 -0.005*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Obs. 1,184,028 1,257,838 1,257,838
Panel D: Age of the drivers
Age Age less 30 Age 30 to 60 Older than 60
Crisis 0.081*** -0.002*** -0.003** 0.005***
(0.023) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 1,184,028 1,184,028 1,184,028 1,184,028
Panel E: Conditions of the driver
Alcohol Stressed&Tired Female Spanish
Crisis 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Obs. 1,257,838 1,257,838 1,247,127 1,257,838
Panel F: Driving behaviour & experience of the driver
Precautions Less Driving Experience More Driving Experience
Crisis 0.002 -0.007*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 1,257,838 1,257,838 1,257,838
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the province-quarter-year-level in parentheses. In each specification,
we control for quarter-year and province fixed effects and provincial linear trends. Significance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.6: Continuous treatment: vehicles and accident context
Panel A. Number of vehicles
Vehicles Pedestrians People in the Vehicle
Crisis -0.005*** 0.002*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Obs. 730,606 728,517 671,499
Panel B: Conditions




Panel C: Timing and type of accident
Rush Hours Working Days Weekend
Crisis -0.001** -0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Obs. 730,606 730,606 730,606
Panel D: Weather and street status




Panel E: Motive of the trip




Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the province-quarter level in parentheses. In each
specification, we control for quarter-year and province fixed effects and provincial linear trends.
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by
***.
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Table A.7: Continuous treatment: characteristics of the people involved (No large
cities)
Panel A: Age
Age Age less 30 Age 30 to 60 Older than 60
Crisis 0.094*** -0.003*** -0.002 0.006**
(0.029) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Obs. 911,762 911,762 911,762 911,762
Panel B: Conditions
Alcohol Stressed&Tired Female Spanish
Crisis 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)
Obs. 977,393 987,656 942,520 965,543
Panel C: Driving behavior & experience
Precautions Less Driving Experience More Driving Experience
Crisis 0.001 -0.007*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Obs. 987,656 987,656 987,656
Panel D: Age of the drivers
Age Age less 30 Age 30 to 60 Older than 60
Crisis 0.126*** -0.004*** -0.002 0.006**
(0.022) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 649,143 649,143 649,143 649,143
Panel E: Conditions of the driver
Alcohol Stressed&Tired Female Spanish
Crisis 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
Obs. 678,301 678,301 671,855 678,301
Panel F: Driving behavior & experience of the driver
Precautions Less Driving Experience More Driving Experience
Crisis -0.000 -0.010*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 678,301 678,301 678,301
Notes: The sample is defined by dropping the observations for the provinces of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia,
and Seville. In each specification, we control for quarter-year and province fixed effects and provincial linear
trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the province-quarter-year level in parentheses. Significance at the
10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.43
Table A.8: Continuous treatment: vehicles and accident context (No large cities)
Panel A: Number of vehicles
Vehicles Pedestrians People in the Vehicle
Crisis -0.002 -0.001* 0.015**
(0.002) (0.000) (0.008)
Obs. 409,760 407,671 407,362
Panel B: Conditions




Panel C: Timing and type of accident
Rush Hours Working Days Weekend
Crisis -0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Obs. 409,760 409,760 409,760
Panel D: Weather and street status




Panel E: Motive of the trip




Notes: The sample is defined by dropping the observations for the provinces of Madrid,
Barcelona, Valencia, and Seville. In each specification, we control for quarter-year and province
fixed effects and provincial linear trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the province-
quarter level in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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